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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIANA BEHRENS, individually and 
as Guardian ad Litem of 
NATHAN ALAN BEHRENS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 























I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 18093 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of 
Appellant's Motion to Amend her Complaint to include a claim 
for punitive damages in this wrongful death medical 
malpractice action. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court denied Appellant's 
Motion to Amend her Complaint. 
III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the Order of the 
District Court enabling the parties to pursue the resolution 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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of the issues framed in the pleadings on file in said lower 
court. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of the inclusion in Appellant's Brief of 
several material misstatements and numerous points of 
argument irrelevant to this appeal, and pursuant to the 
Order of this Court dated April 5, 1982, declaring the 
issues raised here to be only of law, Respondent submits the 
following Statement of Facts: 
On the 16th- day of July, 1978, Robert Alan Behrens 
suffered self-inflicted injuries while a self-admitted 
patient at Respondent's hospital. From these injuries he 
died on or about the 20th day of July, 1978 (R. 35, 36). On 
the 13th day of July, 1979, Appellant served upon Respondent 
a Notice of Intention to Bring Action for Malpractice 
relating to the death of Mr. Behrens (R. 4). 
On or about the 11th day of October, 1979, Appellant 
filed a civil action under Utah's Wrongful Death Statute, 
against Respondent, claiming the death of Robert Alan 
Behrens was the proximate result of the negligence of 
Respondent, and seeking compensatory damages only (R. 2-5). 
The Complaint commencing said action was amended by an Order 
of the district court to conform with the Notice of 
Intention required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1953, as 
amended) (R. 25-30). 
2 
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On or about the 22nd day of September, 1981, Appellant 
filed a "Notice of hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Amend 
Complaint" and a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities" and 
served copies thereof upon Respondent's counsel (R. 454-
456, 458). Appellant did not, however, file or serve any 
motion, nor was a motion stated in the Notice of Hearing. 
On the 6th day of October, 1981, a hearing on the unstated 
motion was held before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Third 
Judicial District Court Judge. On the 13th day of October, 
1981, Judge Taylor issued an Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend Complaint (R. 468-469). Appellant's 
Petition to Grant an [Interlocutory] Appeal was granted by 
this Court on the 1st day of December, 1981 (R. 474). 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT WAS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Rule 7(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
An application to the court for an order shall be 
by motion which, unless made during a hearing or 
trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with 
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought. The requirement 
of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in 
a written notice of the hearing of the motion. 
Appellant neglected to file with the court or serve 
upon Respondent a Motion to Amend in writing stating "with 
particularity the grounds therefor." She failed to 
3 
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otherwise fulfill this requirement by stating her Motion or 
offer the grounds therefore in her Notice of Hearing. 
Moreover, she failed to file, for perusal by the Court and 
Respondent's counsel, a copy of the proposed Amended 
Complaint. Failing to properly make her motion, Appellant 
was correctly denied her request to amend her Complaint. 
B. APPELLANT'S PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT WOULD 
IMPROPERLY AND UNTIMELY ASSERT A NEW CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
On or about the 11th day of October, 1979, Appellant 
filed a Complaint, seeking compensatory damages for alleged 
negligent conduct of Respondent resulting in the "wrongful 
death" of Robert Alan Behrens. Said Complaint was later 
amended pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Strike, but there 
was never a claim for punitive damages until Appellant filed 
the above-described Notice of Hearing. By her unstated 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, Appellant seeks to add a 
second cause of action for punitive damages by reason of an 
alleged "intentional disregard" by Respondent for the safety 
of its patients (R. 454). 
1. An Amendment to a Complaint May Not Allege a 
New or Different Cause of Action. 
Rule lS(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a party may amend his pleading by leave of 
court "when justice so requires." This has been interpreted 
by this Court to allow amendments to complaints which do not 
constitute new or different causes of action. 
4 
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Crane v. Crane, 102 Utah 411, 131 P.2d 1022, 1023 ( 1942); 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 484, 
135 P.2d 919, 923 (1943). 
[T]he test is not whether under technical 
rules of pleading a new cause of action is 
introduced, but rather the test is whether a 
"wholly different cause of action" or "legal 
obligation" is introduced, that is, an amendment 
will be allowed if a change is not made in the 
liability sought to be enforced against the 
defendant. 
Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 172 P.2d 167, 170 (1954). 
The anticipated Amended Complaint will set forth two 
"wholly different" causes of action: one for negligent 
conduct and one for an intentional tort. Only the new 
second cause will support Appellant's proposed prayer for 
punitive damages substantially changing Respondent's 
potential liability. Notwithstanding Appellant's 
contentions that the Amended Complaint will be based on "the 
same parties, the same incident, the same evidence, the same 
testimony, and the same documents" (R. 454-455), it is 
incontrovertable that a new and distinct cause of action is 
being raised thereby. 
2. Any New Cause of Action Asserted by Appellant is 
Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
An action for damages resulting from a wrongful death 
of another person must be commenced within two years 
following said death. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28 (1953, as 
5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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amended). The time for raising a new cause of action from 
the alleged ~wrongful death" of Robert Alan Behrens, 
therefore, expir~d on the 20th day of July, 1980J 14 months 
prior to Appellant's filing of the Notice of Hearing 
concerning her proposed Amended Complaint. 
Unlike an amplifying amended complaint, an amendment 
which sets 'up a new cause of action, different and distinct 
from the original complaint, does not relate back to the 
commencement of action and the statute of limitations 
therefore may run against it to the time of filing. 
Peterson v. Union Pacific R.R., 79 Utah 213, 8 P.2d 627, 630 
(19-32). Inasmuch as Appellant attempts to set forth a new 
and different cause of action by amendment to her Complaint, 
such amendment should not be allowed as it would be contrary 
to recognized rules of practice and procedure in Utah and 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
C. APPELLANT MAY NOT INCLUDE IN HER COMPLAINT 
ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS THAT ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY 
INCLUDED IN HER NOTICE TO COMMENCE MALPRACTICE 
ACTION. 
After stating that a Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action is a prerequisite to the initiation of a medical 
malpractice action, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-8 (1953, as 
amended) provides: "Such notice shall include • • • 
specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the 
prospective Defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries 
and other damages sustained." 
6 
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The Legislative Findings and Declarations of said Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act specifically state that the 
purpose of the Act is "to provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1953, as amended)(Emphasis added). 
Such early evaluation and settlement of claims can be 
accomplished only if the required Notice is timely given in 
strict compliance with requirements set forth in Section 78-
14-8. Such notice would serve no purpose if the specific 
allegations of misconduct upon which the Plaintiff intends 
to rely are not set forth therein. It would be an anomaly 
to allow a prospective Plaintiff to set forth one or two 
specific allegations of misconduct in his Notice and 
subsequently come in with additional specific allegations of 
misconduct in his Complaint. This would thwart the express 
purpose of having the Plaintiff submit a Notice of Intent. 
On July 13, 1979, a Notice of ·rntention to Bring an 
Action was served on Henry Blakley, Administrator of 
Respondent's Hospital. The fourth paragraph thereof sets 
forth the specific allegations of misconduct upon which the 
Appellant relies. 
The specific allegations of misconduct are that 
Mr. Behrens was allowed to obtain the instrument 
which caused his death contrary to the reasonable 
medical practices of health care by professionals 
attending a patient in Mr. Behrens' condition. 
Further, those in attendance knew or should have 
known of the dangers to Mr. Behrens by his mental 
7 
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and emotional condition while in the Raleigh Hills 
Hospital. 
(R. 4). 
Appellant subsequently filed a Complaint herein, making 
several allegations of negligence which were not set forth 
in her Notice. In an Order of the district court dated the 
21st day of December, 1979, said unconforming allegations 
were striken from the Complaint. 
Appellant again seeks to Amend her Complaint by setting 
forth new allegations of Respondent's "intentional disregard 
for the safety" of its patients. There is no mention in 
Appellant's original Notice of any such allegations as are 
now sought to be added to the Complaint nor is a claim made 
for punitive damages. 
After the district court's denial of Appellant's Motion 
to Amend and during the pendency of this Appeal, Appellant 
caused a second Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice 
Action to be served upon Respondent. Apparently recognizing 
the insufficiency of the original Notice to support the 
proposed new allegations of intentional tort and prayer for 
punitive damages, Appellant mistakenly relied on 
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1980), hoping that the second Notice would legitimate the 
initiation of her new claim. Yates dealt with a defective 
Notice served prior to the initiation of a malpractice 
action, said defect being caused by technical nonconformance 
8 
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with the statute. The subsequent Complaint was dismissed, 
not on its merits, and leave was given by this Court for the 
same actio~ to be properly initiated pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended). 
This case is distinct from Yates in several crucial 
ways: (1) The original Notice given here by Appellant was 
not defective and accordingly survives as a proper 
fulfillment of the required condition precedent for the 
pending malpractice action; (2) Appellant's original action 
has not been dismissed, rather the district court refused 
Appellant's request to add a new action; and (3) the desired 
change in Appellant's second Notice is substantive rather 
than procedural. 
Inasmuch as the Appellant attempts to set forth 
specific allegations by amendment to her Complaint which 
were not set forth in her original Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action, such Amendment should not be allowed as it 
would be contrary to the law and purpose of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act. 
D. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN AN ACTION 
BROUGHT PURSUANT TO UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE. 
Under the recognized "general rule," punitive damages 
cannot be awarded in a wrongful death action unless the 
governing statute expressly or by clear implication confers 
the right to such damages. 22 Am. Jur. 2d 704, Death, 
Section 136. (1965 & Supp. 1981). In the great majority of 
9 
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states, the rule for damages in a wrongful death action is 
only to recover the pecuniary loss sustained by the 
survivors. Even when there are aggravating circumstances 
which would warrant punitive damages in another less severe 
injury, they are denied in a death action. 
Ford Motor Company v. Superior Court of the State of Cali-
fornia 175 Cal. Rptr. 39, 41, 120 Cal. App. 3d 748 (1981); 
Mathies_Y.!_Kit~£ell1 350 P.2d 951, 953 (Okla. 1960); 
Burron' s Estate v. Edwards, 594 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Colo. App. 
1979); Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 487 F. Supp. 
1176, 1177 (D.N.D. 1980); Currie v. Fitting, 373 Mich. 440, 
134 N.W.2d 611 (1965); Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983, 
9 8 8 ( N. D. · I 11 • 19 8 1 ) ; Ro s en f e 1 d v • I s a a c s , 4 3 3 N. Y • S • 6 2 3 , 
625, 79 A.D. 2d 630 (App. Div. 1980); Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 
Ohio 2d 20, 374 N.E. 2d 411 (1978); Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 
Va. 1032, 154 S.E. 2d 124, 129 (1967); Greene v. Nichols, 
274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E. 2d 521, 528 (1968); Wagen v. Ford Mot-
or Company, 97 Wisc. 260, 294 N.W. 2d 437 (1980); Magee v. 
Rose, 405 A. 2d 143, 147 (Sup. Del. 1979); Huff v. White 
Motor Company, 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979)(Indiana law); 
Wallace v. Ener, 521 F.2d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1975)(Georgia 
law). This rule has generally been justified on the grounds 
that statutes authorizing actions for wrongful death, being 
in derogation of the common law, are to be strictly 
construed. 
10 
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The Utah statute authorizing a civil action for the 
wrongful death of an adult, as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-7 {1953, as amended), has remained an unchanged 
adoption of Lord Campbell's Act since 1933. This statute is 
not the basis for a survival action based on the decedent's 
transferred rights, but instead creates a new cause of 
action in the heirs of the decedent. Meads v. Dibblee, 10 
Utah 2d 229, 350 P.2d 853, 855 (1960). 
In MO££i~on_Y.!_Pe££~, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 
{1943), this Court addressed the nature of damages allowed 
under the Utah Wrongful Death Statute, as follows: 
The damages recoverable in an action such as 
this are set forth in 104-3-11. R.S.U.1933, as 
follows: "In every action under this and the next 
preceding section such damages may be given as 
under all the circumstances of the case may be 
just." This is nothing more nor less than the law 
seeks in every case of actual or compensatory 
damages. Compensation for loss sustained. Under 
our wrongful death statute, 104-3-11, R.S.U.1933, 
the la_!! does not seek to punish the wrongdoer, but 
simply to compensate the heirs for the loss 
sustained. 
140 P.2d at 780 (emphasis added). The policy of this Court 
to limit damages allowable under this statute to "compensate 
survivors rather than to punish the tort feasor " was again 
recognized in Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254, 274 
(D. Utah 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.1969). This 
joint legislative and judicial policy of permitting only 
compensatory damages to survivors under the Utah statute is 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
entirely consistent with the nature of a traditional 
wrongful death statute. 
Appellant relies heavily on the recent Idaho case of 
Gavica v. Hanson, 608 P.2d 861 (Idaho, 1980) to convince 
this Court to abandon its precent of limiting damages under 
the Utah statute to those of compensatory nature. Although 
Gavica is similar in many respects to the present case, 
there are several unique policies recognized by the Idaho 
Court which preclude undue reliance by this Court on that 
opinion. 
Prior Idaho Supreme Court decisions recognize a 
survival nature of a decedent's rights in a wrongful death 
action in Idaho. Doggett v. Boiler Engineering & Supply 
Company, 93 Idaho 888, 4 77 P.2d 511, 515 ( 1970) ; Helgeson 
v. Powel, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957, 961 (1934). The cases 
from other states which the Gavica court cites for support 
in its reasoning all are based on statute providing for 
survival actions. Although the Court declared it 
"unnecesary to employ a survival action theory "to grant 
punitive damages in Gavica, its case authorities unanimously 
employ that theory. That court also expressly failed to 
find a legislative intent behind the Idaho statute to not 
punish the tort feasor. Gavica v. Hanson, 608 P.2d 861, 865 
(Idaho, 1980). Such an intent has long been recognized in 
Utah. 
12 
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Cases from the State of Arizona illustrate the 
necessary statutory language which would properly allow 
recovery of punitive damages. In Downs v. Sulfur Springs 
Valley Electric Coop., 80 Ariz. 286, 297 P.2d 339 (1956) the 
Arizona Court construed the State's Wrongful Death Statute 
as purely compensatory, disallowing any claim for punitive 
damages. The relevant language of that statute provided "In 
an action for wrongful death, the jury shall give such 
damages as it seems fair and just, •.• "A.R.S., § 12-613 
(1950). The Arizona Legislature thereafter amended that 
statute to read as follows: 
In an action for wrongful death, the jury shall 
give such damages as it deems fair and just with 
reference to the injury resulting from the death 
to the surviving parties who may be entitled to 
recover, and also having regard to the mitigating 
or aggravating circumstances attending the 
wrongful act, neglect or default. 
(Emphasis added) In the subsequent case of Bores v. Cole, 
99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965) the Arizona Court ruled 
the amended statute demonstrated the Legislative intent to 
allow punitive damages. 
The statutes of Utah and California are very similar, 
both permitting the recovery of such damages "as under all 
the circumstances may be j·ust." California has confronted 
the question of availability of punitive damages many times, 
but each time "[t]he California statutes and 
decisions • • • have been interpreted to bar the recovery of 
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punitive damages in a wrongful death action&" Tarasoff v~ 
Regents of University of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 
P. 2d 334 (1976). 
Utah's Wrongful Death Statute has been consistently 
interpreted to establish four elements of recovery. These 
are: (1) loss of support; (2) loss of assistance of services 
to family; (3) loss of probability of inheritance; and (4) 
loss of society, companionship, happiness of association, 
loss of nurturance, guidance and training. Platis v. Unit-
ed States, 288 F. Supp. 154 (D. Utah 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 
1009 (10th Cir. 1969). Punitive damages have not been 
included in this compensatory-directed statute, and are not 
recoverable for wrongful death in Utah. 
When confronted by the same issue, the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division stated: "Plaintiff's arguments as 
to the desireability of allowing the recovery of punitive 
damages in these types of actions, however appealing in 
logic and justice, must be directed to the legislature." 
Rosenfeld v. Isaacs, 433 N.Y.S. 2d 623, 625, 79 A.O. 2d 630 
{App. Div. 1980). This Court likewise must refuse to 
judicially amend the Utah Wrongful Death Statute which has 
heretofore consistently allowed recoveries of only 
compensatory damages. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Order of the 
district court denying Appellant's Motion to Amend her 
Complaint should be affirmed on the basis that Appellant's 
Motion was contrary to the laws of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of May, 1982. 
q~ 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
Brief to be mailed to James E. Hawkes, and Bob W. Warnick, 
301 Gump; Ayers Building, 2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84106, this ~ day of May, 1982. 
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